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Brexit and the Everyday Politics of Emotion: Methodological Lessons from History 
Jonathan Moss, University of Sussex, Emily Robinson, University of Sussex, and Jake Watts, 
Birkbeck, University of London 
Abstract 
The 2016 EU referendum campaign has been depicted as a battle between ‘heads’ and ‘hearts’, 
reason and emotion. Voters’ propensity to trust their feelings over expert knowledge has sparked 
debate about the future of democratic politics in what is increasingly believed to be an ‘age of 
emotion’. In this article, we argue that we can learn from the ways that historians have approached 
the study of emotions and everyday politics to help us make sense of this present moment. Drawing 
on William Reddy’s concept of ‘emotional regimes’, we analyse the position of emotion in 
qualitative, ‘everyday narratives’ about the 2016 EU referendum. Using new evidence from the Mass 
Observation Archive, we argue that whilst reason and emotion are inextricable facets of political 
decision-making, citizens themselves understand the two processes as distinct and competing. 
Introduction 
Politics seems to be becoming increasingly emotional. In a context of 24-hour news cycles and social 
media, we are told that instant reaction takes precedence over considered judgement (Davies, 
2018). Citizens are thinking fast when they should be thinking slow (Kahneman, 2011). People are 
trusting their feelings and emotions instead of evidence and facts (Crouch, 2017). These narratives 
circulate in mass media (e.g. Anon, 2019; Gorvett, 2016; Blair, 2016), intensifying the perception that 
we are living through an ‘Age of Emotion’ (e.g. BBC Radio 4, 2018). Feelings of anger, fear, nostalgia 
and resentment are understood to be particularly powerful and disruptive for established 
democratic norms. Indeed, supporters of Donald Trump, Brexit, and nationalist parties across 
Europe are often perceived to be drawing upon these negative feelings in place of expert knowledge 
(Crouch, 2017; Kluger, 2016; Rachman, 2016). This growing reliance on emotions is generally 
understood to have negative consequences for the health of democracy. As well as being associated 
with nativist attitudes and support for populist parties, the strengthening of citizens’ emotional 
attachments to group identities reduces opportunities for collaboration and compromise and 
increases intolerance and political cynicism (Hobolt et al., 2019; Iyengar et al., 2019). 
The EU referendum campaign was frequently described in emotional terms, as a conflict between 
reason and resentment, fear and hope, heads and hearts. In its aftermath, commentators worried 
that voters had abandoned rationality in favour of passion (eg Hewitt, 2016).  Such interpretations 
caused a dilemma for political scientists, used to explaining the decline of voters’ partisan 
attachments to parties in terms of the triumph of rational modes of behaviour – particularly voting 
on valence issues, such as party competence (Sarkvik and Crewe, 1983; Dalton and Wattenberg, 
2002; Clarke et al., 2004). As John Curtice put it,  
 
Brexit has stirred up a degree of political passion of which, in the wake of the long-term 
decline in the strength of party identification, voters had long since seemed incapable. 
Perhaps the decline in party identification has always been more a consequence of a 
growing inability of parties to secure the affection, loyalty and commitment of voters than, 
as widely assumed, the emergence of a more rational, sceptical electorate that was no 
longer willing to invest emotionally in a political party or cause.’ (Curtice, 2018)  
 
Yet, this is not as novel as recent discussions would suggest and Brexit is certainly not the first-time 
public debate has invoked the binary between emotion and rationality. Abortion and capital 
punishment are examples of issues framed in similarly emotional terms from earlier periods of 




British political history (Langhamer, 2012; Brooke, 2011).  Within political science, an ‘affective turn’ 
has been underway since at least the early 2000s (Prior and van Hoef, 2018; Hoggett and Thompson, 
2002; 2012). Individuals’ inherent emotional dispositions have been used to explain their 
attachment to opinions, identities and political parties, alongside their immediate emotional 
reactions to circumstances and events (Marcus, 2000). Where political scientists had previously 
contrasted affective cues (feelings) to cognitive cues (thoughts), greater attention has recently been 
paid to the interaction between feelings and thoughts, in understanding how affective mood 
mediates our judgements. Indeed, contrary to popular interpretations of the EU referendum, 
Marcus (2003) observes a shift from the conventional wisdom that the intrusion of affect into 
decision making undermines rational consideration (Janis and Mann, 1977), to a more functional 
view of emotion that serves as a helpful heuristic for context-contingent decisions. 
Whilst political scientists have become increasingly aware of the role of emotions in political life, 
they have tended to treat them as stable signifiers of easily recognised experiences. Most studies of 
emotion rely on either large scale public opinion surveys to aggregate and explain the relationship 
between feelings and individual attitudes (e.g. Miller, 2011), or survey experiments to observe their 
impact on micro-level political behaviour (e.g. Huddy et al., 2015). Such methods allow scholars to 
make generalised knowledge claims, but they are less good at reflecting the ‘unruliness and 
unpredictability’ of feelings, or their capacity to circulate between individuals, amongst groups, and 
throughout populations (Ahmed, 2004; Hoggett and Thompson, 2012: 3; Jupp et al., 2014).  
 
Political sociologists have begun to address these concerns by examining the social context of 
emotions and analysing individuals’ emotional experiences. Kleres and Wettergren (2017) show how 
specific emotions, such as fear, hope and guilt, motivate and orient the strategies of climate 
activists; Holmes (2004) demonstrates the ambiguous effects of anger in feminist politics; Manning 
and Holmes (2014) stress the role of affinity in shaping people’s interpretations of politicians and 
political parties. Yet, while these accounts examine the political effects of specific emotions and 
show how emotional norms are negotiated in different ideological contexts, they cannot tell a wider 
story about the changing role of emotion in public life. In order to do this, we need to understand 
how people experience their own emotions and those of others, how they weigh the idea of 
‘emotion’ against that of ‘reason’, and how these feelings-about-feelings fit into the stories they tell 
about politics. We must, therefore, listen to citizens’ own voices as they describe and narrate the 
everyday politics of emotion.  
 
In this paper, we argue that we can learn from the ways that historians have approached the study 
of both emotions and everyday politics. From historians of emotion, we take our concern for the 
specificities of emotional norms, or ‘regimes’ (Reddy, 2001), in different historical contexts. From 
historians of everyday politics, comes our interest in ‘vernacular’ modes of understanding 
(Lawrence, 2019), which treat citizens as experts in their own lives, and pay close attention to how 
they narrate their experiences, via close reading of archival sources. We use new evidence from the 
Mass Observation Project to examine the complex ways in which emotions featured in citizens’ 
reflections on the Brexit debate and on their own decision-making processes. We read this material 
for evidence of the vernacular understandings of the role of emotion in public life in the specific 
context of the referendum, and use this to reflect on the wider emotional regimes within which such 
accounts are produced.  
Two contradictory storylines emerge from these sources.  On the one hand, respondents asserted 
that they were happy to rely on their emotions – their ‘gut feeling’ – as an apolitical source of 
knowledge, in a context in which other sources of information could not be trusted. On the other, 
they condemned emotional voting by others as uninformed, uneducated, deluded, sentimental, 




irrational and thoughtless. We show that whilst much of the emotion in these accounts was 
produced socially, in the interactions between citizens and communities, it was understood to be 
personal and individual. This perception of privateness meant emotions were simultaneously 
understood as a dangerously irrational and selfish element in public life and also markers of political 
authenticity and steadfastness. These contradictory popular understandings of the role of emotion 
in political decision-making have important implications for normative arguments about the need for 
more ‘rational’, ‘slow-thinking’ in contemporary democracies. Not only is it impossible to separate 
feeling from reason, but our understandings of political legitimacy involve a complex negotiation 
between the two. Indeed, these kinds of argument are themselves part of the ‘emotional regime’ 
within which citizens weigh their own decision-making processes against those of others. 
Political Emotion and the Emotional Politics of Brexit  
As we have seen  political scientists have recently begun to turn from ‘cold’ voter calculus to 
emotion in explaining why and how citizens engage with politics (Marcus, 2000; Neblo, 2007), given 
that the likely impact of one vote is minimal, and the costs of participation are likely to exceed the 
benefits (Groenendyk, 2011). Emotional attachments to political parties and group identity is the 
missing ingredient in such collective action problems. Partisan identification and social-psychological 
models of political participation have all emphasised the importance of citizens’ feelings, though 
without explicitly focusing on the role of emotion in public life (Whitely and Seyd, 1996; Fishbein, 
1967). Emotion has been especially important in a context where citizens proved to be ‘innocent of 
ideology’ and to lack information and knowledge of government institutions and policy issues. 
Affective intelligence theory suggests that citizens draw upon their emotions in choosing which cues, 
heuristics, and information should inform their decision making (Marcus, 2003). Anxiety encourages 
individuals to seek more information, whilst anger leads them to close off new sources of 
information and rely upon pre-existing attitudes. Likewise, hope and enthusiasm are associated with 
higher levels of campaign interest and participation, whilst anxiety and anger have been shown to 
affect political tolerance (Marcus, 2000). 
Various studies highlight the role of emotion specifically in shaping citizens’ attitudes towards the EU 
and European integration.  Vasilopolou and Wagner (2017) found that voters who reported feeling 
angry with the EU were less receptive to cost-benefit considerations, less nuanced in their opinions 
about integration, and – unsurprisingly – more likely to want to leave the EU than citizens who 
reported feeling anxious. Verbalyte and von Scheve (2018) draw similar conclusions based on their 
study of Eurobarometer data, which shows a correlation between negative emotions and 
Euroscepticism. Clarke, Goodwin and Whitely (2017) analysed voters’ emotional reactions to the EU 
alongside their cost-benefit calculations about the economy and immigration and found that the 
former had a significant impact on their vote at the referendum. Using qualitative evidence, 
Andreouli and Nicholson (2018) found their focus group members approached the economy through 
pragmatic and rational cost-benefit considerations, whereas political factors like sovereignty were 
subject to emotion and ‘bias’.  This work highlights the important role emotions play in voters’ 
decision making and attitudes towards Europe. Yet, the majority of these studies analyse emotion in 
relation to other variables, rather than looking at citizens’ feelings on their own terms.  
One of the core assumptions in the public discourse of the referendum was that Leave was the 
emotional choice and Remain the rational one. During the campaign, prominent Remainers 
reinforced the idea that they were less comfortable with or practiced at emotional politics, warning 
of the consequences ‘If emotion trumps over reality’, and also arguing that ‘Remain must not cede 
passion or patriotism to the other side’ (John Major and David Miliband, both quoted in Hewitt, 
2016).  Although Leave campaigners, in turn, characterised their opponents as ‘Project Fear’, 




because this ‘fear’ was seen to align with (or, perhaps, respond to) economic calculation, it was 
discredited as an authentic feeling. Remain campaigners later reflected that they had ‘lacked some 
of the authenticity and optimism of the Leave campaign’ (Osborne, 2016). 
This core assumption was reflected in analyses of the referendum’s outcome. For David Marsh 
(2018), the Remain campaign lost because it relied on the arguments of experts about the economy 
and made little attempt to engage with the ‘emotional’ issues of immigration and sovereignty. 
Anand Menon (2017) argues that abstract empirical evidence about the relationship between GDP 
and EU membership did not resonate with voters’ personal and everyday experiences, whereas the 
‘intuitively plausible simplistic thinking’ of Brexiters gave them a significant advantage.  David 
Manners (2018) makes a similar argument, suggesting that critical political psychology approaches 
highlight how ‘the long term privatization of public life and the feeling of neo-liberal alienation and 
insecurity that accompany such processes’ motivated underemployed, undereducated and wealthy 
neo-liberal ruling classes to vote for Brexit. Remain is thus presented as the rational choice, which 
could be overcome only by an appeal to voters’ irrational impulses.  
Finally, thinking about the aftermath of Brexit on British politics, Hobolt et. al (2019) argue that 
affective polarisation is occurring. People are becoming emotionally attached to Leave and Remain 
identities in a similar fashion to partisan identities in the USA. This affects their political identities, 
how they differentiate themselves from alternative groups, and perhaps most importantly, their 
evaluative biases, perceptions of the world, and decision-making processes. Quoting Achen and 
Bartels (2016: 267) they suggest: ‘people use their partisanship to construct “objective facts”’. 
Leavers are less willing to listen to Remainers and vice versa, whilst both groups are likely to 
interpret information on the basis of their emotional attachment to each identity. Such accounts 
feed back into media analysis (Gorvett, 2016; BBC HardTalk, 2018), themselves becoming part of the 
emotional regime which structures citizens’ perceptions of the role emotion is playing in public life. 
The study of political emotion is not, then, a new field. Yet, there is a tendency in these accounts to 
treat the individual as the unit of analysis and emotion as a set of fixed biological and cognitive 
processes, which operate largely outside the realm of personal control or social influence. Emotion 
thus becomes an additional independent variable which can be measured and added into existing 
models. Such positivist treatments of emotion are curiously out of line, not only with work on the 
history, philosophy and social theory of emotions (Kounine, 2017; Scheer, 2012; Nussbaum, 2013; 
Ahmed, 2004; Holmes, 2004), but also with recent psychological thinking (Feldman Barrett, 2017), all 
of which understand emotions to be socially created and culturally contingent. Moreover, even the 
very category of ‘emotion’, and its place in public and political life should be understood as 
culturally, historically and ideologically contingent (Dixon, 2003; Langhamer, 2016).  
 
What is missing from both existing political studies of emotion and accounts of the emotional 
politics of Brexit are the voices of citizens themselves. We may be able to explain why certain 
individuals are more prone to certain voting decisions, or how particular groups of emotions can 
motivate political action, but this tells us little about what that means to the individuals concerned, 
whether they perceive their own decision-making as emotional, or how that sits with their views on 
the political legitimacy of emotions more widely. As Manning and Holmes recently suggested, more 
‘empirical work is required to qualitatively flesh out the role of emotions in people’s deliberations 
about politics…’ (2014: 709).  The rest of this article addresses this space by contributing a new 
account of how people understood the role of emotion in the specific context of the EU referendum.  
 
We approach the emotional politics of Brexit in two ways. First, we look at the position of emotion in 
qualitative, ‘everyday narratives’ about the referendum. We then use these accounts to reflect on 
how were socially constructed and the cultural system they sustained within the context of the EU 




referendum. Unlike existing political studies of emotion, such as those which use affective 
intelligence theory (eg Marcus, 2000; 2003), our unit of analysis is not the individual but the 
‘emotional regimes’ in operation during the referendum. Emotional regime is a concept developed 
by William Reddy (2001) which refers to the established norms for acceptable emotional thought 
and expression created by different states and societies. Reddy’s emphasis on norms fits with Arlie 
Hochschild’s (1979) concept of ‘feeling rules’, which refer to the social conventions that shape how 
people express their emotions in different contexts. We have adopted a similar approach – not to 
show how one dominant emotional regime has been replaced by another – but to explore how the 
EU referendum grew out of the particular emotional context of early twenty-first-century Britain, 
and the tensions it exposed between contradictory yet overlapping understandings of emotion. We 
identify the shared norms, values and everyday narratives about emotion as a source of political 
knowledge, which cannot be captured by other methods. By focusing on ‘everyday’ narratives we 
are able to show that people do not passively receive and internalise norms and values about 
emotion. Rather, they actively construct emotional regimes by embracing, rejecting, adapting, and 
complying with established norms and values. (See Stanley, 2016 and Beattie et al., 2018).  
Using Mass Observation to Identify Emotional Regimes  
We find evidence of these emotional regimes in the records of the Mass Observation Project. Mass 
Observation (MO) is a social research organisation, which deployed a variety of methods to obtain 
information about everyday life in Britain between 1937 and 1955. MO restarted in 1981 and has 
continued ever since to issue ‘directives’ containing open-ended sets of questions to a panel of c. 
1000 volunteer writers every three or four months. Numerous historians and social scientists have 
demonstrated that MO materials can be used as evidence of popular understandings of various 
aspects of everyday life including race (Kushner, 2004), social class (Savage, 2010; Sutcliffe-
Braithwaite, 2017), and formal politics (Clarke et al., 2018). 
 
In 2016 and 2017, 408 respondents were asked to submit their anonymous reflections on the EU 
referendum and Brexit, creating a uniquely rich resource. These discursive accounts provide 
evidence of how citizens interpreted the referendum campaign, the European Union and their own 
subjective responses to both. It also highlights the shared cultural understandings of both the 
political issues at stake and the emotional atmosphere of the campaign that were in circulation. 
They can thus be read as evidence of the emotional regimes surrounding ‘Brexit’ as a political and 
cultural moment. 
 
Indeed, the very existence of Mass Observation is testament to a particular emotional regime, which 
shaped British politics from the interwar years. Established in the aftermath of the Abdication Crisis 
of 1937, it was, from its inception, concerned with recording and understanding public emotions, 
and played an influential role in shaping the norms of postwar democratic culture (Highmore, 2001). 
Claire Langhamer (2016) has shown how MO’s attention to the feelings of ‘ordinary people’ was 
inscribed into the political culture of post-war reconstruction, and identifies an emerging ‘right to 
feel’, which developed alongside other rights discourses and soon became central to political and 
cultural life: 
 
… in the decades after 1945 emotion came to matter a great deal within public as well as 
private worlds, as dominant emotional styles shifted from those rooted in self-discipline to 
those that celebrated self-expression. We see evidence for this shift in the changing self-
representations of politicians and within an everyday political culture which increasingly 
used feeling to unify the nation and to exclude others from it. We see it too in the field of 
journalism and in a growing obsession with taking the ‘mood’ of the nation. It is also 
apparent in the pervasiveness of psychological ways of thinking within the developing 




welfare state, as well as in the permissive legislation of the 1960s in which the right to feel 
and to act on one’s feelings gained a measure of legal sanction. Even the economy was not 
immune to the advance of feeling. A turn towards ‘emotional capitalism’ harnessed 
emotional labour, imposed emotional burdens and claimed to valorise emotional 
intelligence. (Langhamer, 2016: 9) 
 
The shift from a political culture of restraint, to one of self-expression (epitomized in the ‘Diana 
moment’ of 1997) is a familiar story. While politicians have long cast their enemies and outsiders as 
overly emotional, it is only relatively recently that they have been expected to display their own 
emotions as a marker of personal authenticity (Francis, 2002; Dixon, 2015). What Langhamer’s work 
points to is a corresponding assumption that emotion confers political legitimacy. The use of what 
she terms ‘feelings-evidence’ became an increasingly legitimate form of social knowledge, over the 
decades after 1945.  
 
In line with MO’s standard approach, the Brexit directives were framed in emotional terms, asking 
about ‘hopes’ and ‘fears’ twice and ‘feelings’ six times. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that 
Observers responded in these terms. Moreover, as a group, they are arguably more practiced in 
expressing themselves in such terms than the ‘average’ citizen, and more likely to be dutiful, 
engaged, reflexive and critical (Hinton, 2010: 18). It also must be emphasized that MO is not 
representative of the population. Older women from the south-east of England are over-
represented in the panel, as are people of the Left. In the case of Brexit, this cuts two ways. The left-
liberal bias means that we would expect to find more Remainers in the panel, but its age profile 
would tend towards Leavers. These would be significant disadvantages if we were using these 
accounts to explain the referendum result. Unlike other analysts, however, we are not interested in 
measuring how citizens’ feelings affected their decision-making. Rather than reading the responses 
as representative of certain demographic categories, then, we follow Clarke et al. (2018) in using the 
responses to establish the common understandings, expectations, feelings, and judgements 
circulating at the time of the referendum. These accounts provide windows to the cultural resources 
and everyday episteme individuals use to make sense of the world and their place within it. They 
help us to understand how the idea of ‘emotion’ functioned during the debates, and how citizens of 
all political persuasions weighed, deployed, disavowed and rejected it as a source of moral and 
political legitimacy. 
 
Heads and Hearts  
During the referendum campaign, a repeated refrain circulated in news reports that voters would 
have to choose between their heads and their hearts (e.g. Hewitt, 2016). Despite the prevalence of 
this trope among commentators, Observers rarely articulated a distinction between ‘head’ and 
‘heart. Indeed, only one put it in those precise terms: ‘My head says we should stay in, whilst my 
heart calls for me to come out’ (S2083, see Appendix). A handful of other Leave voters described 
placing questions of personal and collective identity, the need for control, and expressions of 
resentment above material or political considerations. One explicitly said that he had voted 
‘Regardless of the economic issues’, adding that he ‘would rather be a poor little Englander than a 
poor and oppressed vassal of the EU’ (B5790). Another explained that she ‘came to resent the 
feeling that we no longer had the power or the ability to live our own lives and determine our own 
future, without interference or direction from “Europe”’ (F3409). In her view, this ‘loss of 
sovereignty […] easily outweighed all pro-Europe arguments’ (F3409). The association between 
strong emotions and voting Leave was underlined by a library assistant from Birmingham, who 
explained that although she ‘was actually 50/50’, she ‘lacked the passion to leave’, adding, ‘if you are 
going to make such a decision you should really want it and I didn’t’ (D3644).   




Most voters, though, did not attempt to separate their strong feelings (for either Leave or Remain) 
into those that came from the ‘head’ and the ‘heart’. ‘Feeling’ was deployed in ways that 
encompassed both organs, and combined them into a form of political intuition. For instance, some 
Remain voters invoked a ‘feeling’ of political unity with the European Union, which they were unable 
or unwilling to justify with detailed political arguments. Yet, they also indicated that a level of 
reasoning underpinned this position:  
I had heard various people on the TV and radio giving their points of view and how it would 
affect them and I just had this feeling that I would be happier to remain than to leave. I felt if 
we were just on our own how could get any help from anyone? (J1890)   
A 35-year-old self-employed writer from Renfrewshire admitted she did not have great knowledge of 
the workings of the EU but noted that ‘it feels better to be part of something; contributing to 
something bigger, than peering in from the outside’ (J4793). A 68-year-old retired family court adviser 
wrote that she ‘voted to remain in the EU, and continue to feel strongly that this is what we should 
do. […] We should be part of Europe and I feel sad that this will change’ (T2004).  
A similar dynamic can be seen in the way Leave supporters described their feelings about sovereignty. 
A 26-year-old administrative assistant explained that it made her ‘feel uncomfortable that people in 
their millions are governed and controlled by a force we have no say over,’ (S6115) while a 53-year-
old locksmith ‘felt its [sic] wrong to pay someone in Brussels to tell me what I can and can’t do’ (R3546).  
Likewise, an engineering works manager from Malmesbury described that he wanted ‘to regain what 
I felt was a sense of destiny, rather than being forced to accept the resolve of unelected people in 
Europe’ (S5915). A retired banker from Southwick resented 
…the increasing way in which the EU was imposing its laws upon us. I wanted us to regain our 
sovereignty and take control of our own laws. Our forebears fought wars to prevent German 
domination of Europe, but this now seems to be happening surreptitiously […] the feeling has 
strengthened bearing in mind the way in which we are being treated by the EU leaders. 
(S3035) 
These are arguments grounded in what Langhamer (2016) calls ‘feelings-evidence’. Observers were 
drawing on their perceptions and personal experiences to make sense of Britain’s relationship with 
Europe and the rest of the world. Contrary to popular belief, they did not think in terms of choosing 
between their heads and hearts, but employed their feelings in ways that encompassed both 
emotion and reason. This is only surprising from the relatively recent psychological perspective that 
separates emotions from rational and moral judgements, rather than more nuanced pre-Victorian 
notions of ‘affections’ and ‘moral sentiments’ (Dixon, 2003). Yet, our findings also highlight the 
dissonance between Observers’ experiences of and beliefs about feelings. In the following sections, 
we identify two common yet distinct and contradictory motifs that respondents drew upon when 
articulating their feelings-about-feelings during the referendum campaign: ‘gut-feeling’ as a higher 
or more legitimate source of knowledge; and emotion as an accusation. We take these as evidence 
of two overlapping emotional regimes. Both, in their separate ways, show the persistence of a 
popular belief that thought and feeling should be distinct, while simultaneously underlining that they 
are not. 
Gut Feeling  
We were struck by how many Observers reported relying on their ‘gut feelings’ or ‘gut instincts’. Again, 
this had been present in media commentary on the campaign (e.g. Jenkins, 2016; Evans-Pritchard, 
2016), It is also consonant with academic understandings of emotions as simultaneously corporeal 




and mental (Feldman Barret, 2017; Scheer, 2012). But what does it tell us about the way Observers 
understood and represented their decision-making processes?  
The recourse to ‘gut feeling’ was particularly prevalent among Remain voters and tended to align with 
the arguments for political unity made on the basis of a more general ‘feeling’, which we examined 
above. For instance, a community health worker from West Bridgford explained that her ‘gut feeling 
is that it’s better to be a part of something and to try to influence changes from within’ (T4715). A 
pharmacist from Solihull explained how she had ‘no real knowledge of whether Britain is better off in 
Europe’ but had a ‘gut feeling that we should not be alone’ (V3773). Similarly, a waitress and student 
from Cheshire described how ‘my gut reaction is that we should stay in the EU, I feel that we work 
better together and we as a nation have a responsibility not just to look after number one’ (B5702). A 
43-year-old charity funding development worker from Bolsover, whose ‘gut instinct’ was similarly that 
the UK should stay, explained that this was partly a matter of wanting to ‘vote the opposite’ to Leave 
campaigners like Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson, who were ‘like throwbacks to the 1950s in their 
attitudes and values. They feed my gut instinct’ (W3994).  
This trope was far more prevalent than that of balancing head and heart, and was often attributed 
to having insufficient information to make a purely cognitive decision. A 50-year-old administrator 
from Birmingham outlined the problem:  
I find it difficult to write about this topic. There is so much conflicting information coming 
from politicians and the media that I find it hard to know what to think […] I voted to remain 
in the European Union last June. It was not a particularly issue-driven decision; rather it was 
my first gut reaction […] Although I have typically felt more British than European, I am 
interested in many different aspects of European culture, and also conscious of (and 
embarrassed by) the UK’s reputation for xenophobia and isolationism. (B3227) 
Despite noting his inability to think about the issues, his response could also be read as an attempt to 
set aside his personal identity in favour of wider moral and political concerns. The interaction between 
consciousness and embarrassment also indicates the complex mix of cognition and emotion in play. 
This relationship also operated in the other direction. A 36-year-old scriptwriter from Ramsbottom 
who ‘thought A LOT about it and was obsessed with the news coverage’, explained that she ‘thought 
about why did I vote to Remain’ and concluded that ‘It was always my gut instinct…I liked being part 
of the EU, part of something bigger. I liked being in the EU queue at the airport and feeling we were 
connected’ (S5688).   
While we encountered the recourse to ‘gut feeling’ more frequently among the responses of Remain 
voters, it was also used by Leavers. One 69-year-old retired nursery teacher repeatedly and helplessly 
suggested that she had no option but to rely on ‘gut feeling’ in the face of a deluge of contradictory 
information: 
…after the initial arguments I was fairly drawn to the idea of Brexit but determined to keep an 
open mind. Since then I watched and read until I have reached saturation point. Is anything 
clearer than it was? Of course not […]  apparently there are ‘facts’ to consider but amazingly 
these can be totally different depending which camp you belong to. Everything else is 
conjecture. Nobody can actually predict the outcomes. So how do we decide? Gut feeling 
probably. (M3408) 
Her account of the questions and arguments she was weighing speaks of a highly emotive public 
debate as well as a complex web of prior assumptions and associations: 




Will we all be Muslim citizens in two generations if we remain in? Will we be blown up or 
raped in the streets by foreigners if we stay in? So many questions and no solid answers. What 
can we rely on? Our vision of the country we hold dear? Common sense? Gut feeling? [list of 
problems, including schools, NHS, housing, low wages, bankers, decline of traditional values, 
bureaucracy] That’s my attempt to fall back on my vision for a future Great Britain together 
with good old fashioned gut feeling but I’m not sure about the common sense bit. (M3408)    
The way in which this respondent responds to information overload by creating her own, seemingly 
authentic form of expertise, drawn from her ‘feelings-evidence’ (Langhamer, 2016), is particularly 
explicit. Moreover, her linking of a ‘vision of the country we hold dear’, ‘Common sense’ and ‘Gut 
feeling’ in opposition to threats from imagined ‘foreigners’ (and particularly Muslims) illustrates Sara 
Ahmed’s point about the way that ‘reading of others as hateful’ it is able to ‘produce’ or to ‘animate 
an imagined ordinary subject, to bring that fantasy to life, precisely by constituting the ordinary as in 
crisis, and the ordinary person as the real victim’ (Ahmed, 2004: 118).  
These claims about ‘gut feelings’ on both sides enable us to unpick some of the feeling rules or social 
norms of this emotional regime that clustered around membership of the EU - from being ‘part of 
something’ to besiegement. More widely, though, it is worth asking what the recourse to ‘gut 
feeling’ was doing as a form of argument. It could, for instance, be read as a performance of political 
modesty, disavowing specialist knowledge.1 This was particularly resonant when Observers recorded 
their doubts about the ability of ‘ordinary’ citizens, to make such an important decision. In the 
absence of ‘correct’ answers, gut feeling was represented as an apolitical, morally neutral source of 
knowledge, which could not be disputed: 
I have no knowledge of the pros and cons, not having exhaustively studied the merits of the 
matter but, like most people in this country am dependent entirely on the propaganda 
showered upon us by the various activists. So, I shall decide my own feelings, whether 
supposedly intelligent or not. (W1382)  
In some cases, it is difficult to know whether such claims were defiant or apologetic. One 42-year-old 
NHS manager wrote simply: ‘Don’t care. Will vote, but it’s an uninformed instinctive thing rather 
than a careful and rational choice’ (D5157), but then sent an updated response after the result 
explaining that she was ‘an IN voter’ who could ‘see only benefits to membership of the EU’, and 
that ‘nothing the Remain camp said (or insinuated) changed my mind.’ It’s not clear whether this 
was a typing error, or a declaration of independence from influence of any kind. She was not alone 
in asserting that ‘No politician of whatever persuasion will make me change my mind’ (G226). Such 
statements can be read as claims to personal authenticity, pitched against politicians, the media, and 
other citizens. This aligns with Langhamer’s point that emotional claims can be used as a tool for 
subversion and resistance – especially when feelings and perceived cultural expectations are in 
conflict. Expertise becomes embodied within the individual because the veracity of emotion is 
difficult to dispute (Langhamer, 2018).  
For Ahmed (2004: 13-14), emotions can be understood to be better than thought when they are re-
presented as a form of intelligence. Moreover, ‘good emotions’ can be cultivated when they are 
defined against unruly emotions. While the Leave vote may have been characterized as driven by 
                                                             
1 It should be noted that Observers are aware that their responses will be read by academics and that, in some 
cases, this colours their writing. For an investigation on the intersubjective relationship between MO 
respondents and researchers, see Annebella Pollen, ‘Shared Ownership and Mutual Imaginaries: Researching 
Research in Mass Observation’, Sociological Research Online (2014) https://doi.org/10.5153/sro.3317 




hateful, fearful and nostalgic impulses, Remain voters were – as we will see below -- perceived as 
spoilt and willful children, unable to restrain their emotional outbursts.  
The embodiment of expertise raises questions about the body and sensation and indeed the location 
where decision-making takes place. Movement between gut feeling and gut instinct in the preceding 
quotes of this section imply these are relatively fluid and unstable categories. Both Ahmed (2017) 
and Åhäll (2018) explain that sensation is important precisely because it leaves individuals ‘with an 
impression that is not clear or distinct’ (Ahmed, 2017: 22). This lack of clarity – the sense that 
something is not right and the bodily movements that accompany such sensations – is arguably what 
makes emotion so powerful in shaping intersubjective relations and judgements.  
 
Emotion as an Accusation 
Although many Observers justified their votes on the basis of emotional or instinctive claims, they 
also worried that others were doing the same. Some tried to be reflexive about this, for instance, 
one noted the need to respect that as she was voting emotionally, other people could be feeling as 
emotional on the other side, yet still noted that despite her own feelings, she was also seeing it 
rationally and could not understand how anyone could not take account of the ‘facts’ when voting. 
(B5567). Many more expressed fear that others, less informed or rational than themselves, would 
vote through prejudice or fear. In line with the dominant media narrative, these people tended to be 
Remainers expressing fear of the emotions stirred up by the Leave campaign. They often portrayed 
Leave voters as uneducated, either unwilling or unable to understand and engage with expert 
arguments, and therefore more susceptible to lies: 
  As a nation we seem to be rejecting reason and logic and facts to feed our own sense of 
injustice. (L5604) 
… the main determinant that I saw was an educated view versus an uneducated view. The 
uneducated view believed all the Leave party lies and a small picture. (M5015)  
I’m dreading the ignoramus masses (the sort who would vote to bring back hanging […]) 
voting with their little Englander brains and their clichés, immigration, take back control, 
border control, loadsa money to spend by opting out of the EU. (B1771)  
They thus reinforced the dominant (though discredited) idea of emotion as a base impulse, which 
can overwhelm the higher functioning of reason: 
I know I am sane and luckily all my friends and family are sane too. I also knew that a lot of 
people were angry or indifferent – those people did exactly what I expected them to. 
(G4566)  
Conversely, a ‘correct’ vote could be used as a proxy for assessing the rationality of others. One 
woman noted that shared support for Remain had cemented her friendships and even ‘made me see 
my in-laws in a more favourable light as […] knowing that they had voted remain made me see them 
as rational and considerate at least for some aspects in life!’ (H5845). 
Leave voters were aware of the emotional charges against them. Some broadly accepted this 
interpretation, and sought to distance themselves from other Leavers. One, for instance, noted that 
a ‘politically savvy’ friend had voted Remain on the basis of ‘valid arguments’ and ‘(admittedly 
boring) facts’, in contrast to his own ‘jingois[m]’ and ‘hope’. Yet, also claimed that he ‘voted based 
on the information (or misinformation) I had at the time, and not because of misplaced patriotism or 




ignorant racism, so my conscience is clear’ (N5744). Others sought to counter such arguments in 
their entirety. A retired lecturer in Chester described the ‘temporary hostility’ in her family, and the 
‘bitter and disappointed’ attitude of Remainers, who ‘continue to think that folk who voted to leave 
are racists and uneducated and that we voted out of ignorance.’ Yet, she went on, ‘I have yet to 
meet anyone who I know that voted to leave who is either racist or uneducated. Why can’t the 
remainers accept a democratic result?’ (B5725)   
Such anger and exasperation at Remainers’ public expressions of emotion in the aftermath of the 
result was widespread and aimed to puncture the entitlement of those used to getting their own 
way. One retired nursery teacher saw calls for a second referendum (appropriately, given her 
profession!) as ‘temper tantrums’ (M3408), while a young administrative assistant described them 
as ‘toddlers throwing toys out of the pram’ (M3408). The impression of the unruliness of others’ 
emotions could not be clearer. 
Managing Feelings During an Exceptionally Emotional Time 
So far, we have highlighted two prominent yet contradictory storylines emerging from these 
everyday responses to Brexit.  On the one hand, in a context of perceived lack of information, 
panellists asserted that they were happy to rely on their emotions – their ‘gut feeling’ – as an 
apolitical source of knowledge. On the other, they condemned those they perceived to be trusting 
emotions as uninformed, uneducated, deluded, sentimental, irrational and thoughtless. People 
placed very different values on emotion as a source of knowledge, which led them to feel uncertain 
about whether or not they should express their feelings during this particularly emotional moment. 
Reading through these files, we were struck, above all, by the emotional strain of the referendum. 
Many experienced the prolonged campaign and its aftermath as something of an onslaught: ‘It 
seems to be an issue that is never resolved; evokes very powerful emotions in some people and 
leads to many fruitless hours of discussion and argument’ (S3779). While many tried to avoid explicit 
discussion about Brexit, they also found that it pervaded daily life: ‘One year on there is a nasty 
atmosphere everywhere. There’s uncaring, snide remarks, rudeness, prickly self-defence and general 
outrage and huffiness about nothing’ (A1706).  
A common theme, especially among Remain voters, was concern about ‘how much anger the 
campaigning is bringing up’ (G2776). Unsurprisingly, the murder of Jo Cox MP stood out as ‘a 
particularly dark moment’, which seemed to ‘reveal something about the mood of the country at 
that point, which was bordering on hysterical’ (V5924). The referendum in general, and Leave 
campaign in particular, were blamed for stirring up ‘fear and hatred’ and ‘unleash[ing] potent forces’ 
(J2891). The febrile atmosphere caused some Observers to fear that ‘we are verging on Civil War’ 
(S1399). Others felt this had effectively already happened: ‘the legal wrangling in the press, on social 
media and in the streets has been tantamount to creating a civil war’ (H5724); ‘I no longer live in a 
country I live in a battlefield’ (A1427). One Leave voter, angered by pro-EU marches issued it as a 
provocation: ‘I don’t fancy their chances… . [sic] Civil war anyone?’ (B5790).  There seems little doubt 
that the EU referendum was experienced – and crucially, narrated – as an exceptionally emotional 
moment in national life. This was often seen as a problem; evidence that the nation was ‘hysterical’ 
or heading towards dangerous divisions. 
While the idea of being ‘too emotional’ was frequently used as an accusation against others 
(predominantly Leavers in relation to the campaign and vote itself, and Remainers in its aftermath) 
some Observers were also surprised by the strength of their own emotions. Remainers in particular 
described feeling unexpected ‘grief’ at the result: 




I don’t think grief is too strong a word for what I felt in the aftermath: I cried daily for a 
while, and felt quite destabilised by what had happened – unexpectedly so …(H6109) 
I’m exhausted by thinking and talking about the subject. […]  I was dismayed beyond belief 
by the result. I’ve raged, questioned, debated, analysed but still can’t come to terms with it. 
(R5682) 
It felt […] as though a rug had been pulled from under us. It was very tempting to feel 
torrents of rage towards people who hadn’t bothered to think through what Brexit 
would/will involve...(D996) 
This final description of being tempted to feel rage suggests a level of control over the decision to 
feel, which is clearly a part of the way this 90-year-old Remain voter constructs her self-image in 
opposition to those who ‘hadn’t bothered to think’. Yet, she also draws on the depth of her own 
emotions to legitimate her claim to speak. Even in cases where Observers described being overtaken 
by uncontrollable feelings, this could involve a considerable amount of ambivalence and negotiation. 
There is, for instance, no single ‘authentic’ emotion in this deeply conflicted account: 
I don’t like feeling that English people are being pushed out of belonging together. I don’t 
like it because that’s how people get into right-wing / nationalist extremism. I’m really not 
like that and I feel uncomfortable for having these feelings. But if I feel that way, what is that 
making someone less rational feel like? (T4715) 
Emotion here is figured as uncontrollable and dangerous. Yet, also as somewhat artificial in that it 
can run contrary to what someone is really like. In this case the attraction of populist emotion has 
disrupted the writer’s identity as a rational Remain voter, and she consequently reaffirms that 
identity by distancing herself from emotions she feels uncomfortable for feeling and draws a clear 
distinction between herself and ‘someone less rational’.  
 
The question of whether to express or suppress emotion weighed heavily on many Observers. For 
some, this was a question of self-control: ‘this subject and anything relating to our ‘government’ has 
me frothing at the mouth and on the whole I generally avoid talking about politics as I become like a 
cross between Citizen Smith and the Hulk’ (G4296). For others, it was a matter of self-preservation. 
One Leave voter, who described himself as ‘liv[ing] in a pro-EU bubble’, reported ‘hav[ing] to watch 
what I say in public gatherings’. He went on: ‘The atmosphere is oppressive and one has a feeling of 
impending violence […]. I have personally been threatened with having my throat cut at a music gig 
[…] there is a feeling of lines being drawn I feel’(B5790). Leave voters were more likely to report self-
suppression on the grounds that ‘People can get quite heated about it’; ‘Everyone is very 
judgemental about whether you were “in” or “out”. It just makes me want to hide my views even 
more’ (H1543). They also believed this was a shared experience: ‘people are not talking about the EU 
because they don’t want to get into a possibly acrimonious debate’ (W663). A 48-year-old railway 
signalling driver in Crewe explained he ‘never talked about this with anyone’ as ‘Life is too short as it 
is and in any case my social media feed was in chaos.’ He added his suspicion ‘that people with 
reasonable views just kept their heads down and stayed out of the bun fight.’ (K5262)  
Reports about discussions (or the lack of them) between family members were common: 
Rarely does a child express shame as I did to my father when he suggested he voted leave 
[sic]. We stick to sport and his grandchildren as safer topics now. (O4521) 
… friends mostly ages 60 -80 years all said that they had voted to leave, all said that they 
have upset their children but, as I, said that they had their grandchildren in mind. (L1991) 




…whereas I used to avoid political discussion with [my parents], I now remind them 
constantly that the mess in this country is their fault […] they have condemned their 
grandchildren and great grandchildren to uncertainty and probably penury  […] they actually 
said, “Well then they’ll know what it was like for us in the 1930s!” I couldn’t believe my ears. 
To have been through such hardship and then want to visit that upon innocent future 
generations is beyond my understanding.’ (W1813) 
I have an aunt and uncles who are all fervently pro-EU, so I have to watch myself, that I don’t 
say anything that would upset them. Mostly I just smile and nod and say I’m bored of the 
whole thing. (B5342)  
As this latter quotation suggests, some Observers implicitly acknowledged a hierarchy of right to 
speak, based on strength of feeling. One Remainer noted that it was only her own ‘lack of passion or 
identity as a European’, which had ‘prevented [her] falling out with any of [her] family, all leave 
voters’ (D3644). Others felt that those with stronger views bore a greater responsibility to manage 
the emotions of others. One elderly Remainer who described herself as ‘astonished’, ‘shocked’ and 
‘angry’ about the result, also noted that ‘when I am with friends I suspect might feel that Brexit is 
the right way forward I don’t mention the subject! I would be in danger of upsetting them with my 
strong opinions!’ (R2144). In contrast, campaigners on both sides were castigated for expressing 
their own emotions without considering those of others. Nigel Farage’s ‘whooping triumphalism’ 
was described as ‘incredibly insensitive’, whereas Bob Geldof ‘stick[ing] his fingers up’ at Farage ‘felt 
like a personal insult to each and every person who will vote Leave’ (B5342).  
The relationship between individual and collective responsibility for emotion was a constant 
negotiation, and plenty of people described feeling ‘shame’ or ‘embarrassment’ for the actions of 
others. One noted that she ‘felt at first ashamed of what “we” had done’, before slipping into 
sadness that ‘other people had taken’ her previously unappreciated European cultural identity from 
her. She then was able to find solace in a shared experience: ‘because I live in London, I did feel at 
least ‘together’ in my outrage and grief’ (H1609). Leave (and even one Remain) voters also 
expressed their joy in the sheer wilfulness of the public expression of emotion: 
It’s so gratifying and brilliant to see people who feel exactly as I do, so much pent-up anger 
at the Metropolitan elite who have controlled us for so long. I still don’t think anything will 
change. (B5342) 
I admire the actions of the masses of people who took this rare - indeed perhaps unique - 
opportunity to stick two fingers up to the establishment, even though they could not know 
in fact the realities of the issue they were voting on or the fearful consequences. (B2710)  
What shocked me most about the referendum is that so many people actually had the guts 
to vote leave rather than stick with what they know. (N5744) 
Emotion was, then, as Ahmed (2004) suggests, experienced collectively. Perhaps paradoxically, the 
perception that the Leave vote was an emotional impulse rather than a reasoned choice lifted it 
above the realm of ‘normal’ politics. Its very wilfulness worked to confirm its status as the authentic 
and incontestable will of the people – despite the narrowness of the result. Dramatically different 
responses had to be managed within both personal relationships and public discourse, this 
interaction created a heightened sense of public mood, and bound individuals together in intensely 
solidaristic or painful relations.  
Conclusion 




Politics in western democracies is commonly described as becoming increasingly emotional. In this 
article, we have aimed to develop a better understanding of how citizens perceive the role of 
emotions in political decision making by adopting an historical approach that analyses the position of 
emotion in qualitative, ‘everyday narratives’ during the specific context of the 2016 EU referendum. 
Through a close reading of responses to Mass Observation directives, we have seen that the 
perceived turn to emotions prompted a great deal of uneasiness, not only from commentators, but 
among citizens themselves. While many were happy to trust their emotions as apolitical and morally 
neutral sources of political intelligence, others explained that they were (more or less reluctantly) 
relying on ‘gut feeling’ in the absence of disinterested and trustworthy sources of information. This 
was not, then, a competition between ‘head and heart’, so much as an attempt to weigh a series of 
competing truth claims.  
While these conclusions underline the extent to which reason and emotion are inextricable facets of 
political decision-making, they also show that citizens themselves understand the two processes as 
distinct and competing. Mass Observers condemned those they perceived to be trusting emotions as 
uninformed, uneducated, deluded, sentimental, irrational and thoughtless. This illustrates that the 
emotional regime of early twenty-first century Britain is infused with the ideal of mind/body 
dualism, in which base instincts should be suppressed in favour of pure reason, even when this runs 
counter to lived experiences. Moreover, Observers tended to reflect ‘classical’ psychological 
frameworks, which depict emotions as a set of fixed dispositions, residing within individuals 
(Feldman Barret, 2017). Indeed, it is the perception that emotions come from within that gives them 
their power. When political discourse is believed to be inherently suspect and immune to ‘pure’ 
reason, then personal feelings appear to be the only authentic source of political wisdom. Finally, 
while much of the emotion in these accounts was produced socially, in the interactions between 
citizens and communities, it was primarily understood to be personal and individual. This perception 
of privateness made emotions seem to be simultaneously a dangerously irrational and selfish 
element in public life and also markers of political authenticity and steadfastness.  
It is difficult to establish general conclusions from this material about how emotions affected voting 
decisions during the referendum. Instead, it provides evidence of the shared sense that this was an 
exceptionally emotional moment, in which feelings carried both greater power and greater danger 
than usual. Both Leave and Remain supporters described the strain of managing their own feelings, 
and those of others, as well as navigating the space between them – whether diplomatically or 
otherwise! Mass Observers repeated recourse to ‘gut feeling’ suggests there is something 
historically distinctive about the Brexit debate, which has more to do with information overload than 
any kind of affective zeitgeist.2  
Most significantly, we have shown that citizens were caught between competing ‘feeling rules’ and 
norms in an emotional regime that both valorises individual feelings and maintains the belief that 
they are separate from, and inferior to, reason. This created the discomfiting sense of a divide, not 
only between irreconcilable views, but between unbridgeable (because fixed and individual) 
emotional responses. As one Remainer in Newcastle explained, ‘it is a result which makes no sense 
to me and which can make no sense to me. […] It is that gulf of understanding between me and the 
people around me that is the most frightening thing’ (J5734).  
Everyday understandings of emotion, and its relation to reason, are messy. We have shown that the 
emotional regimes of Brexit were structured around binary distinctions between feeling and 
thinking, instinct and calculation, passion and knowledge, even as citizens’ own lived experiences 
                                                             
2 We are grateful to Rhjodri Hayward for this observation 




spoke of a far more nuanced set of interactions and negotiations. But it is in this messiness that 
changing notions of political legitimacy are to be found. In order to fully understand the politics of 
the present moment, we argue that we must learn from the methods of History. And that means 
listening to citizens’ voices in specific contexts, in all their contradictory complexity.    
 
   
Appendix  
Year Respondent  Age  Gender Occupation Area Vote 
2017 A1427 55 Male  Theatre Usher Blackpool N/A 
2017 A1706 71 Female  Artist Shoreham Remain  
2016 B1771 80 Female  Retired 
Secretary 
Surrey  Remain  
2016 B2710 85 Male  Retired 
Clergyman 
Newcastle Remain  
2017 B3227 50 Male  Administrator Birmingham Remain 




2016 B5567 43 Female  Freelance 
Consultant  
Bollington Remain 
2016 B5702 25 Female  Waitress and 
Student  
Cheshire Remain 
2017 B5725 57 Female  Retired FE 
Lecturer  
Chester Leave  
2017 B5790 49 Male Unemployed 
Clerk 
Unknown Leave 
2016 D3644 34 Female  Library 
Assistant  
Birmingham Remain 
2016 D5157 42 Female  NHS Worker Nottingham  Unknown 
2016 D996 90 Female  Retired  London Remain 
2017 F3409 70 Female Retired Civil 
Servant  
Nottingham  Leave  
2017 G226 75 Female  Retired 
Counsellor  
Fylde Remain  
2016 G2776 43 Female  Business 
Analyst 
Unknown Unknown 
2017 G4296 40 Male  Archive 
Cataloguer 
Cardiff Remain  
2017 G4566 51 Female  PhD Student  Huddersfield  Remain  




2017 H5724 62 Female  Retired 
Library 
Assistant  
Rugby  Leave  
2017 H5845 37 Female  Midwife Nottingham  Remain  
2017 H6004 63 Male  Retired Civil 
Servant 
Boston-Spa  Remain  












2016 J2891 51 Female  Caseworker Unknown Remain 
2016 J4793 35 Female Writer Johnstone Remain 
2016 J5734 31 Male  Charity 
Worker 
Newcastle  Remain  
2017 K5262 48 Male  Railway 
Signalling 
Designer 
Crewe Leave  
2016 L1991 79 Female  Retired Civil 
Servant  
Brighton Remain  
2017 L5604 36 Male  Teacher Newcastle-
Under-Lyme 
Remain  
2016 M3408 69 Female  Retired 
Nursery 
Teacher 
Coventry  Leave 
2016 M5015 60 Male  Property 
Landlord 
Cambridge Remain 
2016 N5545 23 Male  N/A Stockport Remain 
2016 N5744 38 Male  Carer Sunderland Leave 
2017 O4521 44 Male  Engineer Cambridge Remain  
2017 R2144 81 Female  Retired 
Teacher 
Birmingham Remain  
2017 R3546 53 Male  Locksmith Northallerton Leave 
2017 R5682 44 Male  Librarian Didcot Remain 
2016 S1399 Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown Leave 
2016 S2083 85 Male Retired 
Shopkeeper 
Lewes Remain 
2017 S3035 70 Male Retired 
Banker 
Southwick Leave 
2016 S3779 54 Male  Bereavement 
Counsellor  
Cheadle Remain  
2016 S5774 32 Male  Student  Dundee  Remain 
2016 S5866 36 Female  Script Writer Ramsbottom Remain 




2017 S6115 26 Female  Administrative 
Assistant  
Retford  Leave  
2017 T2004 68 Female Retired Family 
Court Adviser 
Fleet Remain 






2016 V3773 53 Female  Pharmacist Solihull Remain  
2017 V5924 30 Female  Librarian  Oxford Remain  










2017 W1931 65 Female  Retired 
Teacher  
Stone  Remain  




Bolsover  Remain 
2017 W663 74 Female  Retired 
Journalist  
Darlington  Leave 
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